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CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LUTI
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON B-1
CONVERSION AND BASING ISSUES, JULY 22, 2008

REF: A. -OIR FOR CONVERSION INSPECTION DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB
ARIZONA - JANUARY 19 2008

[1](#)B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE - THE SITUATION
RESULTING FROM U.S. ACTIONS INVOLVING
CONVERSION OF B-1 HEAVY BOMBERS DATED
FEBRUARY 15 2008 (EMAILED TO WASHINGTON
- NO REPORTING CABLE)

[1](#)C. GENEVA 0589 (JCIC-XXXII-012)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-013.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: July 22, 2008
Time: 3:00 - 4:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the Russian
Mission on July 22, 2008, to discuss Russian concerns with
the conversion process for, and basing of, the B-1 heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The United
States, Kazakhstan and Russia were represented.

[1](#)4. (S) The Russian Delegation gave a slide presentation
highlighting its concerns with the process of converting B-1
heavy bombers from the category of heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs (LRNA)
to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The
presentation specifically reviewed the conversion inspection
conducted at the Davis-Monthan Conversion or Elimination (C
or E) Facility on January 19, 2008.

[1](#)5. (S) The second half of the meeting focused on Russian

concerns with the basing of converted B-1s and the notifications that the United States had provided regarding those heavy bombers.

A READING FROM THE
BOOK OF CONVERSIONS

¶6. (S) Ryzhkov opened the WG Meeting on July 22, 2008 with a brief review of the agenda, then introduced Akulenok who presented the briefing.

¶7. (S) Akulenok began the briefing and read the relevant Treaty text from the C or E Protocol and Inspection Protocol (IP) regarding the heavy bomber conversion process and the process for heavy bomber conversion inspections. The focus of the Russian position was the requirement of paragraph 11, Section VI of the C or E Protocol to modify all weapons bays, external attachment joints for nuclear armaments, and external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. Akulenok stated that the Russian view of this requirement was that the modifications of these items were required to be irreversible.

¶8. (S) Akulenok continued with a review of the January 19, 2008 conversion inspection conducted at Davis-Monthan C or E Facility (Begin comment: Akulenok was the Russian Inspection Team Chief (RSIT) during that inspection. End comment.). During the pre-inspection procedures, the local site escorts briefed the Russian inspectors on the converted features of the converted non-nuclear B-1 heavy bombers, then added that the B-1 had not had a nuclear mission since 1994, B-1 bases lacked the infrastructure to support B-1 nuclear operations, B-1 software no longer supported nuclear operations, and there were no longer any training programs for aircrew or maintenance personnel regarding B-1 nuclear operations. Akulenok stated that he informed the escort team that this information was irrelevant under the Treaty and asked whether the conversion process would be demonstrated to the Russian inspectors. The escorts told him that it would not.

¶9. (S) Akulenok next presented a detailed analysis of the ambiguities contained in the Official Inspection Report (OIR) for the January 19, 2008 conversion inspection (Ref A). The first ambiguity was for the two nuclear armament-unique cable connectors removed from each of the B-1's three weapons bays. Akulenok stated that the inspectors observed no visible changes to the cable network within each of the weapons bays and that, because the conversion process was not demonstrated to the inspectors, they could not verify that the removal of the connectors had taken place. Without that verification, Russia believed the possibility of mounting a rotary launcher for nuclear armaments still existed.

¶10. (S) The second ambiguity was for the nuclear armament-unique collet receptacles removed from the front and rear pylon attachment joints. Akulenok stated that the U.S. told the Russian inspectors that modifications to the underside of the aircraft made it impossible to operationally carry nuclear-unique pylons, but that START has no definition of operational deployment of nuclear weapons. Akulenok stated that he had to ask the escort team chief whether the collet receptacles they were seeing were the modified receptacles because inspectors had never seen them before (Begin comment: These receptacles had been located underneath the covers, attached using a process equivalent to welding (PETW), and were not observable to Russian inspection teams during previous inspections. End comment.). Akulenok opined that inspectors could not identify the modified receptacles because they had never seen the old ones. To further his point, Akulenok referred to a data update inspection he conducted at Davis-Monthan C or E Facility on July 10, 2008, at which Russian inspectors inspecting a non-LRNA B-1, dismantled and in pieces (tail number 84055), saw that the cover had fallen off a pylon attachment joint with the unmodified collet receptacles. The inspectors were

surprised to see that those receptacles looked the same as the modified ones on the converted B-1.

¶11. (S) The third ambiguity was for the rear pylon attachment joints with metal cylindrical sleeves welded to the inner wall of the socket. Akulenok stated again that Russian inspectors had never seen these joints before and had nothing to compare them with and it was not clear to the Russian inspectors how the welded sleeve precluded the U.S. from attaching pylons (Begin comment: These joints were also underneath the covers attached using a PETW. End comment.). Based on these ambiguities, Russian inspectors were not able to confirm completion of the procedures of conversion for the B-1.

¶12. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian Federation believed the B-1 maintained the capability to carry nuclear weapons and that the distinguishing features identified by the U.S. were insufficient. In accordance with the Seventeenth Agreed Statement, Russia decided to raise the issue at the JCIC.

I CAN READ TREATY VERSE TOO

¶13. (S) Smith thanked Akulenok for his very professional presentation and stated that it was clear and concise and accurately reflected what happened during the conversion inspection at Davis-Monthan AFB in January 2008. Smith also noted that Akulenok had accurately characterized the applicable Treaty text related to the issue and stated that the Treaty text was important.

¶14. (S) Smith highlighted the fact that it was the absolute right of the U.S. to determine how to convert its heavy bombers, there was no obligation or requirement to agree to additional procedures outside the scope of the Treaty, and there was no obligation to demonstrate the conversion process or equipment related to the process to inspectors. Smith noted that there were instances when the JCIC would need to reach agreement on conversion procedures, such as in the case of mobile launchers of ICBMs, but that was not the case for heavy bombers.

A PICTURE IS WORTH
A THOUSAND WORDS

¶15. (S) Smith stated that the U.S. believed it had very clearly demonstrated the conversion process and procedures required by the Treaty and that fact was very apparent in the ambiguity photographs attached to the conversion inspection OIR. Russian inspectors were able to see an observable feature related to each modification in the conversion process. Smith related that the Russian Delegation's view of the need for irreversibility in conversion procedures had been raised in the JCIC before.

¶16. (S) Smith stated that the Russian Federation had demonstrated that ambiguity photographs are of great value for clarifying issues at the JCIC. Because Russian inspectors were given their absolute Treaty right to take photographs related to ambiguities, they were able to better clarify their concerns in the JCIC.

THAT'S NICE, BUT WE STILL DON'T
LIKE YOUR CONVERSION PROCESS

¶17. (S) Ryzhkov acknowledged the U.S. Delegation's Treaty right to develop conversion procedures for heavy bombers, but reiterated that Russia believed the distinguishing features and procedures were not adequate to verify that the B-1 was no longer capable of carrying nuclear weapons and, in accordance with the Seventeenth Agreed Statement, decided to raise the issue within the JCIC. Ryzhkov repeated the

concern from Akulenok's presentation regarding the pylon attachment joints, that because Russian inspectors had never seen the old parts, how could they verify that the modified parts were in fact modified?

I THOUGHT YOU LIKED THOSE

¶18. (S) Smith stated that he did not understand the Russian concerns regarding the distinguishing features, since he was under the impression that Akulenok had been satisfied with the results of the Distinguishability Exhibition carried out at Dyess AFB on February 21, 2008, and that the distinguishing features had been very apparent between the heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA and the heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments (Begin comment: Akulenok had been the RSIT during that exhibition. Akulenok also nodded his head in apparent agreement with Smith's statement. End comment.). Smith reiterated that the focus of the meeting was on Russia's concerns with the conversion process related to what inspectors could observe as a result of the conversion process and that the Russian slide presentation had been very helpful in clarifying those issues.

¶19. (S) Ryzhkov responded that there were different purposes for the conversion inspection and the Distinguishability Exhibition and that, during the Distinguishability Exhibition, the inspectors did not have the right to discuss conversion procedures only to fix the distinguishing features. Ryzhkov repeated that Russia recognized the United States' right to determine conversion procedures, but highlighted the value of distinguishability. Ryzhkov gave a hypothetical example in which a party had two heavy bombers of two different categories. If that party painted the heavy bomber of one category green and the heavy bomber of the other category red, inspectors would have been unable to make an argument. Ryzhkov repeated that Russia simply wanted to understand how and why the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments was incapable of carrying nuclear weapons, and believed the U.S. could have provided more information to clarify and answer those questions.

WHERE'S THAT THING LOCATED?

¶20. (S) Ryzhkov next raised the issue of Russian concerns about the basing of converted B-1 heavy bombers, citing paragraph 23 of Article V and its prohibition against basing heavy bombers of multiple categories at the same air base. Russia was confused by the notifications provided regarding the arrival of a converted B-1 at Dyess Air Force Base (AFB). Russia believed that that bomber was based at Dyess AFB and that the U.S. had violated the prohibition of paragraph 23 of Article V; Russia had sent an Aide-Memoire through diplomatic channels requesting clarification of the U.S. notifications (Ref B). Ryzhkov thanked the U.S. for the great lengths to which it had gone to notify the other Parties of the movements of the B-1 heavy bombers, but stated that specific categories of heavy bombers were required to be located at certain airbases and heavy bombers could only be based at airbases.

¶21. (S) Smith thanked Ryzhkov for repeating the concerns that Koshelev had raised at the Heads of Delegation meeting on this same subject earlier that morning (Ref C). Smith outlined the U.S. position, that all converted B-1 heavy bombers were located at Davis-Monthan AFB as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and that there was nothing in the Treaty that prohibited locating heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan. Smith added that the U.S. had located heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan for many years and had always provided appropriate notifications of those movements as required by the Treaty. Smith reiterated that the B-1 was located at Davis-Monthan, but had been put in visiting status at Dyess AFB. The U.S. assured the Russian Delegation that,

upon completion of the visit of this B-1, the U.S. would notify all Parties of the movements of the heavy bomber and would afford inspectors full Treaty rights at any location where they might encounter B-1s.

¶22. (S) Smith concluded the meeting telling Ryzhkov that Russian concerns had been made much clearer and the U.S. understood them very well.

¶23. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶24. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Smith
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Maj Gondol
Mr. Hanchett
LTC Oppenheim
Mr. Tessier
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Col Akulenok
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Col Novikov
Mr. Serov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶25. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text